Second, there are two propositions describing the nature of God and the nature of justice.
Divine Justice (DJ): God will not violate the proportional nature of justice.
Proportionality (P):
Similar cases deserve similar treatment.
ture of one fairly common conception of Hell and the nature of divine justice. Yet, these propositions are not inconsistent. A step in the direction to inconsistency is to add the following premise.
Borderline (BL):
Any application of a just criterion must judge created beings according to a standard that comes in degrees or admits of borderline cases.
Sider asserts that this addition to the set of propositions mentioned above generates an inconsistency. 2 The thought seems to be this. By (NU), (DC), (DJ), (BL) and (B) God has decided according to a just criterion that comes in degrees that certain individuals are in a much worse condition than borderline and certain of those individuals go to Hell while others go to Heaven. Thus we have an inconsistency.
This explication, though, has tacitly introduced another premise, the premise that there are some individuals that are relevantly similarly who receive dissimilar treatment. We shall call this the existence thesis.
Existence Thesis (E):
There are some individuals in the actual world such that they are relevantly very similar in respects pertaining to the eternal destinations.
There are other possible responses to Sider's argument. One may motivate a denial of the proportionality principle, 3 one may motivate an epistemicist response to this problem, 4 or one may argue that "whimsical generosity" is not objectionable.
5 Though we think each of these responses plausible, we judge that our response is stronger than any of these responses because our argument retains all the original premises of Sider's argument.
Our arguments works like this: We maintain that God can satisfy the requirements of justice described by (DJ) and (P) within the constraints of the targeted doctrine of Hell. This may be done by ensuring that (BL) has no teeth. That (BL) has no bite is ensured by the falsity of (E).
On the Existence Thesis
Consider the following parable (perhaps best read with a British accent, in the style of Monty Python).
Angel Parable
of possible worlds, just as he is about to say the magic words "Fiat w" Gabriel interrupts, "Ahem, Sir, if you don't mind my saying so don't "What do you mean?" God says "Speak plain English why don't you! Preferably King James English . . . just kidding, I do have a sense of humor you know." "Certainly, Sir. It's just that you don't want people so close to one another in respects of salvation that you have to make an arbitrary choice as to whether they go to Heaven or Hell, that would smack of injustice." "Ah, very well, I see what you mean," says God and then is again about to issue the Fiat when Michael interrupts, "Um, Lord, pardon me for saying so, I'm sure you'll have thought of this, but you also don't them. The last thing you want is for it to be clear to all who's got an advantage on whom. They'll no doubt argue about such things anyway, but as long as it's hard to tell no one will have the upper hand. Not to mention the disasters that could occur from people trying to consign the Hell-bound to their fate prematurely. It will be hard for such beings not to play God." "Hmm, very good point. Now before I get started, does anyone else have anything they'd like to say," God asks.
Harold then points out, "Actually, you could save yourself the trouble-though of course it would be no trouble to you-of looking for a world with moral joints between individuals just large enough for you to make non-arbitrary decisions yet just small enough for humans not to see them by picking a world with a gap anywhere below a point where people determinately deserve Hell. Then send everyone above that point to Heaven. They will get more than they deserve, and to varying degrees at that, but no one will have anything to complain about, because they'll all get more than they deserve." around here!" Sider's inconsistency argument assumes that the actual world is not S(oteriologically)-gappy. 6 We now question that assumption. Sider says it is "manifestly false" that the actual world is S-gappy, for "every morally or spiritually relevant factor we encounter in our lives is quite clearly a smear." 7 at his appearance or at his physical stature, because I have refused him. For the LORD does not see as man sees; for man looks at the outward appearance, but the LORD looks at the heart" (1 Samuel 16:7 NKJV). Sider looks at the world and sees no S-gaps. He doesn't say what he's looking for when he does this. We have no theory about what exactly the S-relevant features are according to which one is judged, but we expect that it will be quite complex and "hidden from the eyes of man." 8 This is a case where absence of evidence is not necessarily evidence of absence. We must consider the probability that we would see gaps if they were there. For if the probability of our seeing gaps conditioned on their existence is low, then our not seeing them will not necessarily count as evidence against their existence. It is like Plantinga's case of the noseeums, we have no corresponding reason to think we'd spot a noseeum.
9 This argument is directly parallel to the issue of so-called "skeptical theism" in the literature on the problem of evil.
10 This is not the place to rehash here than in the case of evil). The assumption that the actual world is not S-gappy is essential to his argument, yet he claims to know this contingent fact empirically, even though-as the Creation Parable makes clear and the noseeum case illustrates-on the traditional account which is under
This line of thought is open to the objection that S-relevant features supervene on moral features and M-relevant features are continuous. This objection, however, only relocates the problem (or perhaps just locates it). For the original line of reasoning applies just as well to moral status. We can observe people's behavior, but not their intentions, motives, regrets, or a host of factors that determine whether a person has the relevant moral characteristics. True, we do sometimes infer people's intentions-as best we can-from their observed behavior. But even in moral character. Anyone who has done even a modicum of inner moral within. There is performing a type-identical action fully endorsing the same motives and without any regret. Furthermore, it seems to us that the features of persons upon which -sires and of a higher order. It is plausible that it is morally blameworthy to hold certain beliefs.
11 If so, it could be more morally reprehensible to hold them to a greater degree. For example, the person that has just enough credence to count as believing that members of a certain race are inferior -tain kind of moral sensitivity on their part which blocks further credence. Yet our method of inferring beliefs from behaviors cannot always detect the granularity of a belief. For someone living in a racist community the disutility of acting contrary to those racist precedents will obscure the difference between barely believing it and being convinced of it.
Moreover, though our inferences from behavior might reasonably implicate certain beliefs and desires, they will ordinarily not provide insight into higher-order states such as whether the individual believes their beliefs or desires to be objectionable or desires to have certain beliefs and we submit, are surely factors relevant to the assessment of their moral character. To illustrate this, we present a contrast between two individuals who exhibit identical actions and have the same course-grained mental higher-order considerations we advert to.
Brutal Bart
Brutal Bart goes into his former workplace (where he was recently believes he has a right to the money since he'd worked there for a full year without a raise. He desired to shoot his boss and take the money and believed he could get away with it. He has certitude that his boss has done.
Reluctant Ralph
lieves he has a right to the money since he'd worked there for a full year without a raise. He desired to shoot his boss and take the money and believed he could get away with it. However, Ralph is just barely convinced he has a "right" to the money since he sees that his Boss had a legitimate grievance with him. In fact, when he thinks about it, he -more, he believes his desire to do this is one he should not have and regrets it, believing it to have been a wicked act and desiring that he could undo his wrong.
We think this contrast represents the possibility of undetectable mental bases of moral character which provide reason to doubt our ability to make the kinds of judgments necessary to support Sider's smear thesis. We conclude that Sider's "smear" thesis is thus a dubious and unargued assumption.
There is, however, another reply to our argument that only invokes the possibility of S-gappiness. Sider thinks that the mere possibility of SHell or the conception of divine justice. He reasons:
One . . . wonders what happens in the possible worlds in which gaps are absent. My opponent might claim that gaps are metaphysically necessary, or, more plausibly, claim that in worlds without gaps some component of the binary conception of hell would need to be abandoned. I am somewhat inclined to object that it would be unbecoming of God to use a criterion that would allow for possible cases of injustice if applied in every possible world, even if those cases do not actually arise.
12
There are a number of things to say in reply to this. First, since God exists in every possible world (or so we shall assume) and has his properties essentially, it follows from the fact that God has overriding reasons not to allow non-S-gappy worlds that it's not even metaphysically possible for a world to fail to be S-gappy. 13 There is no manifest problem with this suggestion. Second, and more importantly, there is nothing morally suspect about using a criterion to adjudicate between actual cases that can admit of borderline cases. If I am to distribute medicine to large groups of people and I use a criterion that gets the actual cases right then the possibility of that criterion leading to morally objectionable distributions in other nonactual situations is just not relevant to the actual morality of my action. This is especially obvious when I know that it will get the actual cases right. We judge that a similar case applies to God's use of a criterion based morality, there are no violations of morality. 4. Epistemicism is a view about the nature of vagueness which holds that vagueness is a result of ignorance. For instance, suppose Bob is a borderline case of baldness. It is unclear whether Bob is bald or not. Epistemicism explains that this inability to judge whether Bob is bald or not arises because we Timothy Williamson, Vagueness (New York: Routledge, 1994 ). An epistemicist response to the current problem would hold that we are ignorant of the preproblems it solves. Sider's argument is just another instance in which epistemicism solves an intractable problem." be that there would be borderline individuals with respect to their soteriological properties then one should think God may decide to send to Hell only the tremendous goods, creating that world wins the day. to be possible that aren't if there is a necessarily existing God who has all powers essentially. To turn this into an objection to theism would require a very strong tie between conceivability and possibility. In Conee and Sider's Riddles of Existence (OUP, 2005) , chapter three, an objection is raised from "vanishing possibilities" to the existence of a necessary being. The objection is that lots of apparent possibilities vanish if there is a necessary being. A full response to this objection is beyond the scope of this paper, but notice that this argument cuts both ways: if a necessary being does not exist, then by S5 modal reasoning, a necessary being is impossible, but it seems possible. Furthermore, any interesting metaphysical thesis should be metaphysically necessary and thus make its apparently possible rivals metaphysically impossible, e.g., gunk theory or true atomic theory. Finally, we might have thought it possible for water to be XYZ. The moral of the story is that metaphysical possibility is not perspicuous.
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